AIR FRANCE AF 447 Flight Path and damages suffered by the plane due to
collaterals of dam surges on the plane during its scheduled flight on 31 May
2009 and 1 June 2009
© 2017 Ramaswami Ashok Kumar
Applying the precautionary Principle,
I make a new analysis of Air France Flight AF 447 assuming that the sum of the
world’s dam content changes at any time applies a force on the plane every time
an earthquake is caused by the dams, from the moment it takes off to the time
of its landing. This vertical force, which is down during the dry season,
October to May, is orders of magnitude fold the total engine thrust developed
by the engines. The stand alone
acceleration of the plane caused by this application of force assumed to act on
the centre of gravity of the plane is computed. This acceleration in g’s is a
measure of the severity of the damage to the plane. By juxtaposing the final
report’s narrative on the history of the flight’s factual information(1) with
the acceleration suffered by the plane at various times as measured by analysing
the data on earthquake(s) near that time, evidence is produced of proof of the
consequences to the plane caused by the
dam content changes which also intensify the weather during each hydrological
cycle(2). The exercise follows. This
should be read with the Final Report of BEA( Ref 1). The Buffet Warning is so
so real with dams complicit, not only for AF 447 but for EgyptAir MS804 as well
as MH 370’s complete disappearance, that this study must be duly addressed and
confirmed by all concerned and aware of the unacceptable dangers of the risk.
The risk must be evaluated and considerably reduced as the final report so
tragically reveals (1). There is nothing more tragic than ignorance in action.
For
our purposes the map above is just the thing we want in order to explain the
phenomenon of the catastrophic plunge of the Air France Airbus:
Date of accident 1st June 2009 at 2 h 14 min 28(1)
Site of accident at reference 3°03’57’’ N, 30°33’42’’ W, or 3.065833333, -30.56166667 near the TASIL point, in
international waters, Atlantic Ocean.
You will note that this is on the Mid Atlantic Ridge, and around the
crash site is a cluster of earthquakes caused by dams of the world between
1973-06-01 to 2017-04-08! The crash is near the blue earthquake location on the
Mid Atlantic Ridge.
Rio de Janeiro Latitude = -22.9068, Longitude = -43.1729
Rio de Janeiro Latitude = -22.9068, Longitude = -43.1729
Type of flight International public transport of passengers
Scheduled flight AF 447
(1)All times in this report are UTC, except where otherwise
specified. Two hours should be added to obtain the legal time applicable in
metropolitan France on the day of the event, and three hours subtracted for Rio
de Janeiro time.
Aircraft Airbus A330-203 Registered F-GZCP Owner and
Operator Air France
Operator Air France
Persons on board Flight: crew: 3, Cabin crew: 9, Passengers:
216
ACARS: Aircraft Communication Addressing and Reporting
System
1 - FACTUAL INFORMATION 1.1 History of Flight.
On Sunday 31 May 2009, the Airbus A330-203 registered F-GZCP
operated by Air France was programmed to perform scheduled flight AF 447
between Rio de Janeiro Galeão and Paris Charles de Gaulle. Twelve crew members
(3 flight crew, 9 cabin crew) and 216 passengers were on board. The
departure was planned for 22 h 00. At around 22 h 10, the crew was
cleared to start up engines and leave the stand.
Legend: time refers to the time of the dam caused
earthquake, damquake. SM is the seismic moment of the quake. The figure
multiplied by 10^19.05 gives the value in Newton meters. CG refers to the
centre of gravity of the water masses behind the world’s dams for the period
mentioned above the location of the centre of gravity. Dist,km refers to the
distance between the location of the epicentre of the quake and the centre of
gravity of the dams, as defined above. DBCM denotes the dam content change in
BCM which caused the quake. Force is the force in newtons(N) applied on the
aircraft at its centre of gravity. Mass in kg is the mass of the fully loaded
aircraft AF 447 during the flight.
The aeroplane left the stand with a calculated weight of
233,257 kg. The estimated takeoff weight was 232,757 kg for a maximum
authorised takeoff weight of 233 t.
Takeoff took place at 22 h 29. The Captain was Pilot Not
Flying (PNF); one of the copilots was Pilot Flying (PF). At the start of the
Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) recording, shortly after midnight, the aeroplane
was in cruise at flight level 350. Autopilot 2 and auto-thrust were engaged.
Auto fuel transfer in the “trim tank” was carried out during the climb. The
flight was calm.
Note the enormous
application of vertically downward force by dams on the plane at 00:53:31.720Z
on 2009-06-01: 332 times the engine thrust of the two engines together. The
total thrust developed is a maximum of 622000 Newtons.
At 1 h 35, the aeroplane arrived at INTOL point and the crew
left the Recife frequency to change to HF communication with the Atlántico Oceanic
control centre. A SELCAL Selective Calling System test was successfully carried
out, but attempts to establish an ADS-C Automatic Dependant
Surveillance-Contract ( ADS-C) connection with DAKAR Oceanic failed.
Shortly afterwards, the co-pilot modified the scale on his
Navigation Display (ND) from 320 NM to 160 NM and noted “…a thing straight
ahead”. The Captain confirmed and the crew again discussed the fact that the
high temperature meant that they could not climb to flight level 370.
At 1 h 45, the aeroplane entered a slightly turbulent zone,
just before SALPU point.
The crew dimmed the lighting in the cockpit and switched on
the lights “to see”. The co-pilot noted that they were “entering the cloud
layer” and that it would have been good to be able to climb. A few minutes
later, the turbulence increased slightly in strength. Shortly after 1 h 52, the
turbulence stopped.
The co-pilot again drew the Captain’s attention to the REC
MAX value, which had then reached flight level (FL) 375. A short time later,
the Captain woke the second co-pilot and said “[…] he’s going to take my
place”. At around 2 h 00, after leaving his seat, the Captain attended the
briefing between the two co-pilots, during which the PF (seated on the right)
said specifically that “well the little bit of turbulence that you just saw we
should find the same ahead we’re in the cloud layer unfortunately we can’t
climb much for the moment because the temperature is falling more slowly than
forecast” and that “the logon with DAKAR failed”.
Note that at this point, the force applied on the plane by the dams at 01:56:48Z would be 22 times the total engine thrust of 622000 N and equal to 6g. At 1:43:02.450Z, the applied force would have been 71 times the total thrust of the engines - an acceleration of 19g.
Then the Captain left the cockpit. The aeroplane approached
the ORARO point. It was flying at flight level 350 and at Mach 0.82. The pitch
attitude was about 2.5 degrees. The weight and balance of the aeroplane were
around 205 tonnes and 29%.
F-GZCP - 1st June 2009
22
The two copilots again discussed the temperature and the REC
MAX. The turbulence increased slightly. At 2 h 06, the PF called the cabin
crew, telling them that “in two minutes we ought to be in an area where it will
start moving about a bit more than now you’ll have to watch out there” and he
added “I’ll call you when we’re out of it”. At around 2 h 08, the PNF proposed
“go to the left a bit […]”. The HDG mode was activated and the selected heading
decreased by about 12 degrees in relation to the route. The PNF changed
the gain adjustment on his weather radar to maximum, after noticing that it was
in calibrated mode. The crew decided to reduce the speed to about Mach 0.8 and
engine de-icing was turned on. At 2 h 10 min 05, the autopilot then the
auto-thrust disconnected and the PF said “I have the controls”. The aeroplane
began to roll to the right and the PF made a nose-up and left input. The stall
warning triggered briefly twice in a row. The recorded parameters showed a
sharp fall from about 275 kt to 60 kt in the speed displayed on the left
primary flight display (PFD), then a few moments later in the speed displayed
on the integrated standby instrument system (ISIS). The flight control law
reconfigured from normal to alternate. The Flight Directors (FD) were not
disconnected by the crew, but the crossbars disappeared.
Note: Only the speeds displayed on the left side and on the
ISIS are recorded on the FDR; the speed displayed on the right side is not
recorded. At 2 h 10 min 16, the PNF said “we’ve lost the speeds ” then
“alternate law protections”. The PF made rapid and high amplitude roll control
inputs, more or less from stop to stop. He also made a nose-up input that
increased the aeroplane’s pitch attitude up to 11° in ten seconds. Between 2 h
10 min 18 and 2 h 10 min 25, the PNF read out the ECAM messages in a
disorganized manner. He mentioned the loss of autothrust and the
reconfiguration to alternate law. The thrust lock function was de-activated.
The PNF called out and turned on the wing anti-icing. The PNF said that the
aeroplane was climbing and asked the PF several times to descend. The latter
then made several nose-down inputs that resulted in a reduction in the pitch
attitude and the vertical speed. The aeroplane was then at about 37,000 ft
and continued to climb. At about 2 h 10 min 36, the speed displayed on the left
side became valid again and was then 223 kt; the ISIS speed was still
erroneous. The aeroplane had lost about 50 kt since the autopilot disconnection
and the beginning of the climb. The speed displayed on the left side was
incorrect for 29 seconds. At 2 h 10 min 47, the thrust controls were pulled
back slightly to 2/3 of the IDLE/ CLB notch (85% of N1). Two seconds later, the
pitch attitude came back to a little above 6°, the roll was controlled and
the angle of attack was slightly less than 5°. From 2 h 10 min 50, the PNF
called the Captain several times. At 2 h 10 min 51, the
stall warning triggered again, in a continuous manner. The thrust levers were
positioned in the TO/GA detent and the PF made nose-up inputs. The recorded
angle of attack, of around 6 degrees at the triggering of the stall warning,
continued to increase. The trimmable horizontal stabilizer (THS) began a
F-GZCP - 1st June 2009
23
nose-up movement and moved from 3 to 13 degrees pitch-up in
about 1 minute and remained in the latter position until the end of the flight.
Around fifteen seconds later, the ADR Air Data Reference , ADR3 being selected on the right side PFD(PFD Primary Flight Display ),
the speed on the PF side became valid again at the same time as that displayed
on the ISIS. It was then at 185kt and the three displayed airspeeds were
consistent. The PF continued to make nose-up inputs. The aeroplane’s altitude
reached its maximum of about 38,000 ft; its pitch attitude and angle of attack
were 16 degrees. At 2 h 11 min 37, the PNF said “controls to the left”, took
over priority without any callout and continued to handle the aeroplane. The PF
almost immediately took back priority without any callout and continued
piloting. At around 2 h 11 min 42, the Captain re-entered the cockpit. During
the following seconds, all of the recorded speeds became invalid and the stall
warning stopped, after having sounded continuously for 54 seconds. The altitude
was then about 35,000 ft, the angle of attack exceeded 40 degrees and the
vertical speed was about -10,000 ft/min. The aeroplane’s pitch attitude did not
exceed 15 degrees and the engines’ N1’s were close to 100%. The aeroplane
was subject to roll oscillations to the right that sometimes reached 40
degrees. The PF made an input on the side-stick to the left stop and nose-up,
which lasted about 30 seconds. At 2 h 12 min 02, the PF said, “I have no more
displays”, and the PNF “we have no valid indications”. At that moment, the
thrust levers were in the IDLE detent and the engines’ N1’s were at 55%. Around
fifteen seconds later, the PF made pitch-down inputs. In the following moments,
the angle of attack decreased, the speeds became valid again and the stall
warning triggered again.
Figure 1: History of Flight
F-GZCP - 1st June 2009
24
At 2 h 13 min 32, the PF said, “[we’re going
to arrive] at level one hundred”. About fifteen seconds later, simultaneous
inputs by both pilots on the side-sticks were recorded and the PF said, “go
ahead you have the controls”. The angle of attack, when it was valid, always
remained above 35 degrees. From 2 h 14 min 17, the Ground Proximity Warning
System (GPWS) “sink rate” and then “pull up” warnings sounded. The recordings
stopped at 2 h 14 min 28. The last recorded values were a
vertical speed of -10,912 ft/min, a ground speed of 107 kt, pitch attitude of
16.2 degrees nose-up, roll angle of 5.3 degrees left and a magnetic heading of
270 degrees. No emergency message was transmitted by the crew. The wreckage was
found at a depth of 3,900 metres on 2 April 2011 at about 6.5 NM on the
radial 019 from the last position transmitted by the aeroplane.
References
1. Ministère de l’Écologie, du Développement durable, des
Transports et du Logement
Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de
l’aviation civile
Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de
l’aviation civile
Zone Sud - Bâtiment
153 200 rue de Paris Aéroport du Bourget 93352 Le Bourget Cedex - France T :
+33 1 49 92 72 00 - F : +33 1 49 92 72 03 www.bea.aero
Final Report
On the accident on
1st June 2009 to the Airbus A330-203 registered F-GZCP operated by Air France
flight AF 447 Rio de Janeiro – Paris
2. R. Ashok Kumar. 2013. Glaring Lacuna in meeting water needs: Severe Monsoon Extreme Events
are caused by the Dams of the World.
Link: http://glaringlacuna.blogspot.in/2013/07/severe-monsoon-extreme-events-are.html
3. Aerodynamics-Wikipedia:
An aircraft in flight is free to rotate in three dimensions: pitch, nose up or down about an axis running from wing to wing; yaw, nose left or right about an axis running up and down; and roll, rotation about an axis running from nose to tail. The axes are alternatively designated as lateral, vertical, and longitudinal. These axes move with the vehicle and rotate relative to the Earth along with the craft. These definitions were analogously applied to spacecraft when the first manned spacecraft were designed in the late 1950s.
These rotations are produced by torques (or moments) about the principal axes. On an aircraft, these are intentionally produced by means of moving control surfaces, which vary the distribution of the net aerodynamic force about the vehicle's center of mass. Elevators (moving flaps on the horizontal tail) produce pitch, a rudder on the vertical tail produces yaw, and ailerons (flaps on the wings that move in opposing directions) produce roll. On a spacecraft, the moments are usually produced by a reaction control system consisting of small rocket thrusters used to apply asymmetrical thrust on the vehicle.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aircraft_principal_axes
4. Angle of Attack3. Aerodynamics-Wikipedia:
An aircraft in flight is free to rotate in three dimensions: pitch, nose up or down about an axis running from wing to wing; yaw, nose left or right about an axis running up and down; and roll, rotation about an axis running from nose to tail. The axes are alternatively designated as lateral, vertical, and longitudinal. These axes move with the vehicle and rotate relative to the Earth along with the craft. These definitions were analogously applied to spacecraft when the first manned spacecraft were designed in the late 1950s.
These rotations are produced by torques (or moments) about the principal axes. On an aircraft, these are intentionally produced by means of moving control surfaces, which vary the distribution of the net aerodynamic force about the vehicle's center of mass. Elevators (moving flaps on the horizontal tail) produce pitch, a rudder on the vertical tail produces yaw, and ailerons (flaps on the wings that move in opposing directions) produce roll. On a spacecraft, the moments are usually produced by a reaction control system consisting of small rocket thrusters used to apply asymmetrical thrust on the vehicle.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aircraft_principal_axes
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/aero_12/whatisaoa.pdf
5. https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-an-aircraft-stall-282603
